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Abstract
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1)
individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on
urban growth. We embed these three elements in a model of a dynamic economy with two
sources of friction: ill-dened property rights on future land development and uninsurable
shocks a¤ecting labor productivity. We characterize the feedback between the households
desire to invest in housing as a hedge against the risk of rent uctuations and their support
for supply restrictions once they own housing. The model generates an ine¢ ciently low
supply of housing in equilibrium. The model also rationalizes the persistence of housing
undersupply: the more restricted the initial housing supply, the smaller the city size selected
by the voting process. We use the model to study the e¤ects of a number of policies and
institutional changes.
Keywords: Housing Supply, Housing Demand, Regulatory Policies, Political Economy.
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1 Introduction
An increasing body of evidence points to the importance of supply restrictions in under-
standing housing price dynamics. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a) report that changes
in regulatory regimes explain the scarcity of land for housing development in what are today
the most expensive U.S. housing markets. They point to di¤erences in man-made scarcity
as a determinant factor for the explosion of the dispersion in housing prices across U.S.
housing markets since the mid-seventies. Quigley and Raphael (2005) also blame housing
regulation for the recent housing price boom in California.1 Green, Malpezzi and Mayo
(2005) nd that housing supply regulations are the key driver of di¤erences in housing sup-
ply elasticities across U.S. metropolitan areas. In the United Kingdom, Barker (2003, 2005)
identies the regulatory constraints on the release of land for housing development as the
primary reason behind the unresponsiveness of housing supply to price increases.
What are the determinants of housing supply regulations? Restrictive supply regulations
cannot survive without political support. To understand the political economy of housing
supply, we need to understand who participates in the decision process, the stakes of the
participants, and the mechanism whereby participantspreferences translate into policies.
We then need, at a minimum, a location choice model to determine who lives in a particular
area and a housing investment model to predict what real estate assets the residents own.
We also need a collective choice model to map the identities and preferences of local residents
into political decisions over urban growth.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a rst step towards a theory that encompasses
these three elements: housing consumption, housing investment and collective choice over
housing supply regulation. Each of these three elements is quite complex and linked to the
others through multiple channels. We do not try to capture in one model the richness of
the institutions that regulate these three phenomena. Instead, we o¤er a parsimonious and
tractable framework to gain some insight into the basic issues and to link areas of research
that have traditionally been separate.
In this spirit, we assume only two deviations from complete markets. The rst is a
key feature of housing markets: building permits are needed for new construction, and
they are issued by the local government. Hence, while property rights on existing buildings
are relatively well-dened, property rights on future construction are blurred. The second
1For further evidence on the critical impact of housing regulations on housing supply, see Ozanne and
Thibodeau (1983), Rose (1989), Malpezzi, Chun and Green (1998), Mayer and Somerville (2000), Glaeser
and Gyourko (2003), Glaeser and Ward (2006), Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005c).
1
deviation is a staple assumption in macroeconomics: Households cannot insure against
future labor income shocks. As we shall see, the combination of these two imperfections
is su¢ cient in equilibrium to generate an undersupply of housing and cause persistence of
undersupply.
In the baseline model, we consider a country with one city and a vast countryside.2
A continuum of agents live for two periods. In the rst period, every agent is assigned
a productivity level. Productivity and location are complementary: The more productive
agents are even more productive if they live in the city rather than in the countryside.3
Agentsproductivity may change from the rst to the second period. In particular, there
may be a technological innovation with two e¤ects: an increase both in average productivity
and in the turbulence in the productivity levels of individual agents. Turbulence involves a
reordering of individual productivity levels. For instance, the IT revolution that occurred
in the San Francisco Bay Area in the nineties boosted overall productivity but had a more
positive e¤ect for certain workers (e.g software engineers) than for others (e.g. nurses and
teachers).
Agents who move to the city in the rst period have the option to buy or to rent their
house. All houses are identical and can only accommodate one agent. We also assume that
homeownership is a continuous choice variable, going from unboundedly negative (short-
selling city real estate) to unboundedly positive (owning multiple houses in the city, or
derivatives on the city housing price index).4
At the end of the rst period, city residents vote to determine housing supply in the
second period: They select the number of construction licenses to be issued. A key element
of the model is the institutional mechanism that regulates the distribution of new licenses.
The windfall gain deriving from new construction can accrue to homeowners (e.g. licenses
are sold to developers and the revenues distributed to local homeowners), residents (licenses
are sold to developers and the revenues are used for local services), or to a set of measure
zero of the population (lucky or clever developers in case of an arbitrary mechanism, or
well-connected developers and perhaps corrupt public o¢ cials in case of favoritism). We
2 In Section 6 we will allow for multiple cities.
3Although we interpret our model in terms of labor productivity, there is a mathematically equivalent
interpretation in terms of quality of life (discussed in detail on page 7). In that interpretation, the benet
of living in the city (perhaps a beach resort) is due to local amenities, which are more valuable to certain
people. Within both interpretations, housing is a hedge against rent risk.
4 In Section 6, we study the e¤ect of legal restrictions that make home ownership a binary choice between
renting one home or buying one home.
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are particularly interested in situations in which only a small portion of the gain accrues to
residents or homeowners.5
Equilibrium is determined by two orders of interactions. In the housing market, agents
choose how much to invest in real estate. A city resident who does not own housing faces
a rent risk. A positive productivity shock increases the average wage in the city, and hence
rent. The resident can ensure against this risk by purchasing housing. Because productivity
shocks are associated with income turbulence leading to mean reversion, the rent hedging
motive is stronger for agents who currently enjoy high labor productivity. In equilibrium,
investment in housing is therefore an increasing function of the agents current productivity
level.
On the political side, agents who are more invested in housing are more likely to favor
a restrictive licensing regime. This leads to a rst, natural result: In equilibrium, housing
is undersupplied. Voters support articial supply restrictions in order to protect their
investment. In turn, they invest because they expect the value of their housing investment
to be protected by urban growth restrictions. This generates an unambiguous welfare loss
because the city remains too small. All citizens, before investing in housing (but after
learning their individual productivity level), would support a commitment to increasing
housing supply to the maximum possible level.
More important, the model displays persistence in housing undersupply. The degree
of undersupply in the second period is an increasing function of undersupply in the rst
period. This is not due to construction costs (there are none) but to the interaction between
hedging demand and politics. A city with a low initial housing supply is a city with an
initial population of high-productivity agents who pay a high housing price or rent relative
to their income. The median voter is then highly invested in housing, and he is keen to
keep the city small and housing expensive. Under plausible assumptions, there is no new
construction, which leads to the most extreme form of size persistence. The opposite occurs
in a city that starts from a relatively high housing supply and thus low housing costs relative
to income.
5To our knowledge, there is little systematic evidence on the distribution of windfall gains. In her
comprehensive review of housing supply in Britain, Barker (2003, Chapter 5) argues that: (1) Developers
hold option agreements on large tracts of land currently without building permission; (2) Developers have
signicant local market power; (3) While local authorities have a legal avenue to demand monetary transfers
in exchange for issuing building permission, the payments obtained in this way are quite low (of the order
of £ 2000/8000 per unit built See Table 8.2 in Barker). These three facts taken together seem to indicate
that most of the windfall gains accrue to developers. Things may be di¤erent in Hong Kong, where the
government uses an auction mechanism to sell land for development (Wall Street Journal, 10/24/2006).
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Once we identify the potentially vicious circle between homeownership and housing
supply, we can begin to discuss the e¤ects of a number of institutional reforms that have
been suggested. First and foremost, one needs to question the current mechanism for
allocating housing permits. While the allocation system varies widely across countries (and
even within countries), it typically does not take the form of an auction (except for the
Hong Kong example mentioned in footnote 5). Our model formally identies a strong link
between the housing undersupply and the share of windfall gains that accrues to the median
voter. The most natural way to break the vicious circle of housing undersupply is to create
simple legal instruments through which local communities can appropriate windfall gains.6
Second, we study the e¤ect of making city planning decisions at a more or less centralized
level. We have assumed that housing supply decisions are taken at a level that corresponds
to the local labor market (i.e. a metropolitan area). In practice, city planning may occur at
a di¤erent level. At one extreme, the U.K. Town and Country Act of 1948 and subsequent
laws give the national government enormous power over planning decisions. The government
can in practice force local communities to accept large-scale land development. At the other
extreme, a number of metropolitan areas around the world (this is true for most large U.S.
cities) are not under a unied jurisdiction: Planning decisions are made by a number of
autonomous local governments. Our paper shows that there exists a U-shaped relation
between the degree of centralization and equilibrium housing supply. A very centralized
system and a very decentralized one result in more construction than a situation in which
local government coincides with local labor markets. A centralized government wants more
housing supply because it takes into account the welfare of countryside residents (who may
move to the city if more houses are built). A very decentralized system falls into a beggar-
thy-neighbor equilibrium whereby local residents do not internalize the negative price e¤ect
that construction in their community imposes on the rest of the metropolitan area.
Third, we examine the e¤ects of subsidizing homeownership. Encouraging households
to own more housing gives them an obvious incentive to restrict urban growth. This is
what happens in equilibrium: When homeownership is subsidized, households vote for a
more restricted housing supply in the second period and housing is more expensive.
6This point seems to have escaped governments concerned with housing a¤ordability. For instance, the
recent comprehensive report sponsored by the UK Treasury (Barker 2005) uses a wealth of information to
show that housing ination in the United Kingdom is because of an undersupply of land, which in turn is due
to the unwillingness of local authorities to make more land available. However, the policy recommendation
is to tax windfall gains and transfer the proceeds to the central government and to deprive local government
of the only existing channel to appropriate some of the developersrent (the so-called section 106see
Barker (2005, p.7, recommendation 29)).
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Fourth, we study the e¤ect of imposing restrictions on fractional ownership. Caplin et
al. (1997) argue that current rules make it di¢ cult for people to share ownership of their
home with others. We compare the baseline case with a set-up in which people can only
own zero or one home. Besides the direct portfolio e¤ect discussed by Caplin et al., we
identify an indirect supply e¤ect of restrictions to fractional ownership. The elimination
of such restrictions is likely to make housing more a¤ordable through increased political
support for urban growth.
Our paper brings together two inuential strands of literature on housing that have
hitherto remained mostly separate.
The rst strand moves from the premise that a meaningful discussion of the housing
market must include an endogenous housing supply function. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks
(2005b) provide a detailed model of the decision process involved in authorizing housing
development. They study the e¤ects of changing judicial tastes, decreasing ability to bribe
regulators, rising incomes and demand for public amenities, and improvements in the ability
of homeowners to organize and inuence local decisions. They nd that a signicant increase
in the ability of local residents to block new projects is the main driver for the rise in urban
growth restrictions. They conclude that cities have changed from urban growth machines
to homeownerscooperatives. Our paper forgoes most of the political process complexity of
Glaeser et al. in order to endogenize the composition of the local population, households
tenure decision, and hence their preferences for urban growth.
Our approach to the voting decision builds on the work of Fischel (2001), who provides
detailed arguments and empirical evidence that downside risk motivates homeowners to
participate in the planning process. He argues that homevotersare politically motivated
by the risk of loss on their home because of the di¢ culty to diversify this risk away. House-
holds in our model are motivated not only by potential loss because of new construction
but also by the prospect of capital gains when aggregate demand increases.
The second strand of literature endogenizes housing investment by modeling the tenure
choice of risk averse households in a stochastic environment (e.g., Ortalo-Magné and Rady,
2002, Sinai and Souleles, 2005, Hilber, 2005, Davido¤, 2006, Shore and Sinai, 2006). This
strand of literature links housing prices with expected future rents and shows that home-
ownership provides a hedge against future housing expenditures. Sinai and Souleles (2005)
developed a stylized model of dynamic investment decisions by households facing stochastic
rent uctuations and endogenous house prices, and they show that it can account for a
number of observed patterns in tenure decisions.
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Our model incorporates this key insight about housing demand in a market equilibrium
model. The rent risk is now endogenous, and it is the combined e¤ect of labor productivity
shocks, householdslocation decisions, and collective supply decisions. As in the contribu-
tions cited above, the possibility of rent uctuations gives housing a hedging value, which
pins down homeownership patterns and, in turn, determines political support for urban
growth.7
While our model brings together these two frameworks, it neglects by necessity a
number of important issues related to housing supply. In particular, we abstract from the
issue of local taxation for the provision of local public goods, peer e¤ects and agglomeration
economies.8 As several papers have shown, externalities are essential to understanding
the political economy of housing supply. In this paper, we abstract from them in order
to clarify the dynamic connection between homeownership and housing supply. We will
mention where appropriate how our model could incorporate local externalities. Also, our
model considers only one  stylized  form of growth restriction. We do not consider
regulation pertaining to height, density, use, etc.9 This choice, again, is in the interest of
parsimony. Our methodology can easily be extended to other forms of regulation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. For expositional
purposes, we rst analyze the model holding housing supply xed (Section 3) and we then
endogenize supply and study the political equilibrium (Section 4). We discuss the persis-
tence result in Section 5. Section 6 studies the e¤ect of institutional reforms. Section 7
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
7One may wonder whether the link between preferences over urban growth and individual labor produc-
tivity levels could be obtained, in a deterministic model, through a simple wealth e¤ect. However, the fact
that rich people consume more housing than poor people is not enough. One must also argue that rich
people have a reason to spend proportionally more on purchases rather than on rentals, which in a world
without uncertainty requires ad-hoc assumptions (e.g. rental-related transaction costs are relatively higher
than purchase-related transaction costs for expensive properties or the tax advantage to owning is increasing
in income).
8See Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) and Calabrese, Epple and Romano (2006) for studies of the political
economy of zoning regulation and its interaction with the provision of local public goods.
A number of papers analyze growth controls in a static setting. They focus on issues related to the
creation of amenities and the distribution of the value generated by the location of economic activity within
cities; e.g., Brueckner (1995), and Helsley and Strange (1995), Brueckner and Lai (1996). As mentioned in
Brueckner and Lai, a dynamic model is necessary to capture the motivation for growth controls that comes
from the prospects of capital gains on ones home.
9For references, see for example Wheaton (1998), and Bertaud and Brueckner (2004). Note that Glaeser
and Ward (2006) nd that a variety of regulations, which act as very e¤ective barriers against new construc-
tion, generate little price e¤ects beyond their e¤ect on housing density. For example, if high minimum lot
sizes were used to improvethe mix of a community and such improvementshad a signicant economic
impact, their housing price e¤ect would be greater than that justied by their restrictive e¤ect on the number
of homes that can be built
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2 Model
Consider a two-period model of an open economy with two locations, the city and the
countryside. There are two commodities, housing and a numeraire consumption good.
For simplicity, we abstract from housing construction costs. Housing in both communities
consists in homogeneous plots of land. The economy is populated by a mass 1 of agents
with identical CARA utility dened over consumption of second period numeraire only,
u(c) =  e ac.
The endowment of numeraire good each agent receives every period depends on his loca-
tion and his productivity index i 2 [0; 1]. We normalize the productivity in the countryside
to zero.10 Let yi be a random variable uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. In the rst period,
if agent i works in the city, his productivity is yi1 = y
i. In period 2, the distribution of
earnings evolves as follows. With probability 1   , no shock occurs: if agent i works in
the city, his productivity is yi2 = y
i
1 = y
i. With probability , there is a positive shock to
aggregate productivity: average productivity increases by g > 0. Conditional on this shock
occurring, with probability 1 ; the productivity of agent i in the city is yi2 = yi+g. With
probability , all agents draw a new productivity parameters ~yi from the initial productiv-
ity distribution. The productivity of agent i in the city is then yi2 = ~y
i + g. The expected
aggregate growth rate of the economy between periods 1 and 2 is therefore g. The greater
the probability , the more insecure are the agents about their future productivity.
Our key assumption about the labor market is that there is positive correlation between
growth and turbulence. If the economy grows faster, there is a higher probability that the
income ranking in period 1 is changed in period 2. Such a positive correlation could be
because of technological change. Every time an important innovation is introduced, most
agents reach higher productivity levels but certain agents, whose skills become obsolete,
lose out, at least in relative terms.11
This same mathematical formulation also has a di¤erent interpretation in terms of leisure
rather than productivity. The variable yi represents the utility that agent i gets if he lives
in the city, which can now be seen as an area with certain amenities. Such amenities
may be natural (a coastal region, a ski resort) or man-made (a historical town, a vibrant
10Our results could easily be extended to a more general setting in which the productivity of agent i at
time t is yit in the city and ay
i
t in the countryside, where a 2 (0; 1).
11An alternative model, which would yield qualitatively similar results, is one in which a positive shock
corresponds to random waves of new groups of skilled professionals. Such arrivals produce a twofold e¤ect:
The city reaches a higher average income, but the previous city residents are now relatively poorer that the
newcomers.
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metropolis). Shocks in yi derive from social phenomena that determine shifts in preferences
for amenities (the desire to retire to sunnier climates, the feasibility of telecommuting,
reduced crime rates in large cities). Such shifts create both a higher average utility of living
in the cityand turbulence in the utility rankings of agents. For concreteness, the rest of the
paper will refer to the productivity interpretation rather than to the leisure interpretation.
Working in the city requires consuming one unit of city housing. We denote lit the
housing consumption by agent i in period t where lit = 1 if the agent locates in the city,
lit = 0 otherwise.
Independently of their housing consumption choice, agents may also invest in city hous-
ing. Let hit 2 ( 1;1) be the measure of city housing that agent i owns in period t. We
do not restrict this measure to be a positive integer. A noninteger hit indicates fractional
property. A negative hit means that the agent has sold city housing short for period t. In
practice, there are serious obstacles to fractional property and to shortselling properties.12
In the countryside, the supply of housing is perfectly elastic at a cost normalized to
zero. There are no moving costs between city and countryside.
There is a measure N1 of housing in the city at the start of period 1 owned initially by a
a large number of international real estate investment trusts (REITs), which maximize the
expected value of their real estate investment. At the end of period 1, city residents choose
the measure N2 of houses available in the city in period 2. We assume existing houses
cannot be destroyed and no depreciation of the housing stock, N2  N1. city residents
therefore vote on the number of building permits that will be issued, N2  N1  0.
Permits are assumed to be identical, divisible, and immediately tradeable. Given the
parameters  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1], the permits are allocated as follows:
 A proportion 1  of the permits goes to a set of measure zero of the population. We
think of this as the classical system of allocating permits to certain developers without
asking them for a payment corresponding to the capital gain they will experience.
These developers may in turn return some of the windfall gain to city o¢ cials in the
form of bribes or campaign contributions. We assume that developers and o¢ cials
represent a negligible proportion of the city population (and hence the median voter
never benets from this share of permits).13
12We thus abstract for the time being from a number of potential imperfections of the housing mar-
ket (later, we will discuss the e¤ect of restrictions to fractional properties and the introduction of scal
distortions).
13The writer Tom Wolfe (New York Times, 2006) o¤ers a vivid account of the permit allocation process
in New York City. A key role is played by the Landmarks Preservation Commission, a body that decides
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 A proportion  is allocated to current residents in equal parts. This is the case in
which permits are allocated to developers, but in exchange for a payment or for the
provision of certain goods or services (building a park, paying for infrastructure, etc).
 A proportion  (1  ) goes to the owners of existing properties in the city in propor-
tion to the number of properties they own in the city. This case may arise when the
city pursues a policy of densication.
As soon as they are issued, building permits can be freely traded. Let b represent the
total market value of permit issued by the city.
The property markets open at the start of each period. Let rt denote the rent and pt
denote the unit price of housing in the city at period t. Competition among REITs ensures
that the price of housing is equal to its expected rent return plus any benet that accrues
from the sale of building permits. We assume an exogenous interest rate of zero between
periods 1 and 2 for ease of exposition.
To sum up, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. Period t = 1 begins, agents learn yi.
2. The property market opens, agents choose hi and li.
3. City residents vote on the measure of city houses N2 to be made available in period
2. A measure N2  N1 of building permit is issued in proportion  to city residents
(in equal parts) and in proportion  (1  ) to owners. These permits can be traded
immediately.
4. Each city resident receives yi1 and pays the rent r1. Permit holders can build new
houses in the city at zero cost.
5. Period t = 2 begins, both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are realized, agents learn
yi2
6. The property market opens, agents choose li2.
7. Each city resident receives yi2 and pays the rent r2.
whether a designated landmark building can be altered or replaced. Because landmarks tend to be located
in highly desirable areas, the commissions decisions can generate large windfall gains for the owners of the
buildings. We would argue that Tom Wolfes description can be represented by an allocation system with
 = 1.
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8. Agents consume their accumulated wealth.
To summarize, the accumulated wealth of agent i at the end of the game is
wi = li1

yi1 +  
N2  N1
N1
b  r1

(1)
+ li2
 
yi2   r2

+ hi

r2 + r1 +  (1  ) N2  N1
N1
b  p1

:
We need parameter assumptions g < 1a and
 (1  ) 1
N1
(1 N1 + g) < 1: (2)
The rationale for these assumptions will become clearer in the next sections.
3 Housing Market Equilibrium Exogenous Housing Supply
To make the analysis more transparent, we proceed in two steps. In this section, we assume
that the city size is exogenously given in both periods. We provide a full characterization of
the individual housing investment and location decision, and we derive the unique market
equilibrium. In the next section, we will endogenize the size of the city in period 2.
Suppose that N1 and N2 are exogenously given and known to the agents with N2  N1.
Under this condition, we characterize the set of city housing prices and rents such that: (1)
the REITs are indi¤erent between renting and selling properties, (2) the housing markets
clear in each period when the agentshousing consumption and investment policies maximize
their utility when they take the housing prices and rents as given. We proceed by backward
induction.
Once the period 2 shock is realized, agent i faces a simple one period deterministic loca-
tion choice problem. He lives in the city if and only if city earnings more than compensate
the rent: yi2  r2. In equilibrium the N2 most productive agents live in the city. The period
2 market rent is then given by the earnings of the N2th most productive agent:
r2 =

1 N2 if there is no aggregate shock
1 N2 + g with an aggregate shock
The price of a building permit issued at time 1 is the expected value of a unit of housing in
period 2 evaluated before the realization of the shock
b = E [r2] = 1 N2 + g:
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The location choice in period 1 is simple as well. The N1 most productive agents live
in the city. The market rent is determined by the willingness to pay of the N1th most
productive agent:
r1 = 1 N1 +  N2  N1
N1
b;
where the third term accounts for the fact that city residents receive a proportion  of the
building permits.
Given the presence of REITs, which are risk neutral and have deep pockets, the price
of a house in period 1 is the expected present values of period 1 and period 2 rents plus the
value of the building permits that ownership of a house gives rights to:
p1 = E

r2 + r1 +  (1  ) N2  N1
N1
b

= 1 N1 +

1 + 
N2  N1
N1

b+ E [r2] :
The period 1 price of a house captures the benets of the building permits allocated to
both renters and owners. The payo¤ of buying a unit of real estate in period 1 depends on
the realization of the shock in period 2: investors loose g if there is no aggregate shock
and gain (1  ) g if there is a shock. Given that period 2 is the last period of the model,
p2 = r2.
Substituting equilibrium rents and prices into equation (1) yields the following expression
for nal wealth:
wi = li1
 
yi1   1 +N1

+ li2
 
yi2   1 +N2

+ hiD;
where D =  g if there is no aggregate productivity shock and D = (1  ) g otherwise.
Now that we know how agents choose where to locate and also know the benets of
ownership, we can write the nal utility of agent i conditional on his choice of hi as follows:
 If there is no shock:
UNN = u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi   1 +N2
  hig
 If only the aggregate shock occurs:
USN = u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi   1 +N2

+ hi (1  ) g
 If both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shock occur:
USS = E~y

u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; ~yi   1 +N2

+ hi (1  ) g
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When no idiosyncratic shock occurs, the income of city residents increases by the same
amount as the city rent. This explains why city earnings in period 2 are identical in the
rst two expressions above. When an idiosyncratic shock occurs, agents face the possibility
of reduced earnings in a state when second period rents are high because of the aggregate
shock. Such a realization makes housing a useful asset to own because it delivers gains
(1  ) g at the time when the agents face the risk of a decrease in earnings, at the cost of
losses in the state when the agents face constant earnings.
To decide how much housing to buy, agent i solves
max
hi
(1  )UNN +  (1  )USN + USS :
Proposition 1 Given 0 < N1  N2 < 1, there is a unique market equilibrium with the
following properties:
(i) In period t, agent i lives in the city if and only if yit  1 Nt;
(ii) An agent with rst-period income yi buys h^i units of housing, where h^i is the unique
solution of
 U 0NN

h^ii; y
i

+ (1  )U 0SN

h^i; yi

+ U 0SS

h^i; yi

= 0;
with
U 0NN
 
hi; yi

= u0
 
max
 
yi   1 +N1; 0

+max
 
yi   1 +N2; 0
  hig ;
U 0SN
 
hi; yi

= u0
 
max
 
yi   1 +N1; 0

+max
 
yi   1 +N2; 0

+ hi (1  ) g ;
U 0SS
 
hi; yi

= E~yi

u0
 
max
 
yi   1 +N1; 0

+max
 
~yi   1 +N2; 0

+ hi (1  ) g :
Besides the location part, this is a classical insurance result. Agents use housing invest-
ment to transfer utility across states of the world. Given the standard properties of the
utility function, this equilibrium is unique. Solving the equilibrium basically amounts to
solving a rst order condition for every agent. We now use these conditions to characterize
the comparative statics of the market equilibrium:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium:
(1) Housing investment is nondecreasing in yi (strictly increasing for yi > 1 N2 );
(2) There exists y > 1   N2 such that agents with yi < y choose hi < 0 and agents
with yi > y choose hi > 0;
(3) If  is su¢ ciently high with respect to g, hi > 1 for all agents with yi > y + ",
" > 0;
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(4) A marginal increase in N2 induces agents with yi < 1 N2 to buy less housing and
agents with yi > 1 N2 to buy more housing.
(5) A marginal increase in N1 keeping N2 > N1 has no e¤ect on housing investment
decisions.
To understand property (1), note rst that if an agent chooses to live in the city in
period 1, he remains in the city in period 2 unless he su¤ers an idiosyncratic income shock
that decreases his period 2 productivity below the new rent. We saw above that investing in
city housing generates a loss if no aggregate productivity shock occurs and a gain otherwise.
Investing in city housing therefore allows residents to transfer wealth from the state when no
aggregate shock occurs to the states when an aggregate shock occurs possibly concurrently
with an idiosyncratic shock. The higher an agents productivity in the rst period, the
greater the probability that an idiosyncratic shock will result in a loss of earnings, therefore
the greater his demand for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and the greater his housing
investment.14
Property (2) builds from the fact that city residents with the lowest productivity pay a
rent equal to their earnings. They get no benet from living and working in the city in period
1. They also get not benet from the city in period 2 if no idiosyncratic shock occurs. If the
idiosyncratic shock occurs, any marginal agent who draws a lower productivity moves to the
countryside and gets a surplus of zero. Any marginal agent who draws a higher productivity
stays in the city and enjoys a positive surplus. Because of risk aversion, marginal city
residents want to shift resources away from the state in which an idiosyncratic shock occurs.
They therefore sell city housing short in the rst period. At the other extreme, the agents
who start with the highest productivity can only lose from an idiosyncratic shock. To ensure
against this loss, they take a long position in city housing in period 1. By monotonicity of
the optimal housing investment policy, there must be city residents who do not own any
city housing. Any resident with lower productivity goes short on housing, and vice versa.15
Property (3) exploits the fact that housing investment is increasing in the agents pro-
ductivity and in the probability they su¤er an idiosyncratic shock. The greater an agents
productivity and the greater the probability of an idiosyncratic shock, the more the agent
14The fact that agents with higher endowment hold more housing is critical for our results. Here we
obtain this prediction from the specication of the income process. Note that a number of alternative and
complementary assumptions could generate a similar housing investment in equilibrium. For example, we
would expect housing investment to increase with income in a world with heterogenous property size and
moral hazard in the rental market that makes it optimal to own rather than rent large homes.
15 Imposing a no-short-sale constraint on housing investment would not take anything away from our results
but would complicate the analysis; see Section 6.4.
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stands to loose if the idiosyncratic shock occurs. Therefore, the greater the hedging demand
of this agent for housing, hence the greater the quantity of housing the agent purchases in
period 1.
A higher N2 yields a second period rent lower by the same amount in all states and a
lower city housing price in the rst period. The same quantity of housing investment in the
rst period therefore yields less resource transfers in the second period across states. Since
a change in N2 does not bring about a change in the income risk faced by agents, they need
to take larger positions in the housing market. Agents who short the housing market take a
bigger negative position. Agents who take a long position in the market buy more housing.
This explains property (4).
Finally, property (5) follows from the fact that the housing supply in period 1, N1 a¤ects
the rent in period 1 and the price in period 1. It does not change the extent to which housing
investment allows agents to shift resources across states in period 2. This explains why per
se a change in N1 does not a¤ect housing investment.
Example
We will use N1 = N2 = 12 ,  =
1
2 , g =
1
12 ,  =
1
2 . The CARA coe¢ cient is 2.
If yi  12 , the agent lives in the city and his marginal utilities are:
U 0NN
 
hi; yi

= exp

 2

2

yi   1
2

  1
24
hi

;
U 0SN
 
hi; yi

= exp

 2

2

yi   1
2

+
1
24
hi

;
U 0SS
 
hi; yi

=
Z 1
1 N2
exp

 2

yi   1
2
+ max

0; ~yi   1
2

+
1
24
hi

d~yi:
The rst-order condition for i is
0 =   exp

 2

2

y   1
2

  1
24
hi

+
1
2
exp

 2

2

y   1
2

+
1
24
hi

+
1
2
exp

 2

y   1
2
+
1
24
hi

1  1
2
exp [ 1]

:
If yi < 12 , the agent lives in the countryside and buys an amount of housing that is
independent of yi and equal to the amount of housing bought by the marginal city resident.
The optimal amount of housing investment is hi =  0:578) for the agents with yi = 12 .
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The optimal amount of housing is plotted below:
Agents with income yi = :756 buy one unit of housing. This enable them to transfer
1
24 units of numeraire consumption from the state in which no shock occurs to the states
where the aggregate shock occurs. They expect to consume .472 units of numeraire if no
shock occurs, .556 if there is an aggregate shock only, and .042 if both the aggregate and
the idiosyncratic shocks occur. Without the opportunity to buy housing, their expected
consumption levels would be 0 if the idiosyncratic shock occurs and .514 otherwise.
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4 Endogenous Housing Supply
We now revert to the full-edged game introduced in Section 2. The size of the city in
period 2 is decided by residents through a vote. A certain size is a political equilibrium if
there is no majority of voters who want to deviate to a smaller or to a bigger city. Together
with the political equilibrium condition, we will also have the conditions on location choice
and housing investment that we derived in the previous section.
We focus attention on equilibria in undominated pure strategies.16 We shall see that
such an equilibrium always exists.
Suppose the game has an equilibrium in which voters select a certain city size N2. We
let N^2 denote a possible deviation from N2. The agents take as given the equilibrium p1
and r1 that correspond to the supply N2. They internalize the fact that changing housing
supply a¤ects the rent in period 2 and the value of the housing permits.
The nal wealth of agent i is
wi = li1
 
yi1 + 
N^2  N1
N1
b^  r1
!
+ li2
 
yi2   r^2

+ hi
 
r^2 + r1 +  (1  ) N^2  N1
N1
b^  p1
!
;
where b^ = 1 N^2+g and r^2 = 1 N^2 if there is no aggregate shock, and r^2 = 1 N^2+g
otherwise.
Proposition 3 Given deviation N^2, agent is nal wealth is
wi = li1
 
yi1   1 +N1 + 


+ li2

yi2   1 + N^2

+ hi

D +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


;
where D =  g if there is no shock and D = (1  ) g if there is a shock, and 
 represents
the e¤ect of deviation to N^2 on the total market value of new housing permits per unit of
existing housing:

 =
N^2  N1
N1

1  N^2 + g

  N2  N1
N1
(1 N2 + g) :
To understand Proposition 3, note that on the equilibrium path N^2 = N2; 
 = 0, and
the expression for is wealth boils down to:
wi = li1
 
yi1   1 +N1

+ li2
 
yi2   1 +N2

+ hiD:
16As usual in majority voting, there can be equilibria in dominated strategies involving a coordination
failure, with the property that the median voters preferred policy is not selected. The restriction to pure
strategies is made to keep notation light.
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In equilibrium, the number of new permits N2 N1 is fully internalized in house prices and
rents. The number of houses in the second period only a¤ects agent i through its real e¤ect:
More people will be able to move to the city if N2 goes up.
O¤ the equilibrium path, a deviation from the conjectured number of houses creates a
potential windfall gain for city residents (in proportion ) and homeowners (in proportion
 (1  )), but it also generates a price drop for homeowners that is captured by the term
N2   N^2.
We now need to resort to the technical assumption (2). This restriction is satised if N1
or  are not too small or  is not too large. For example, this condition is satised when
none of the benets from the building permits accrue to the residents or homeowners. The
assumption guarantees that the building permit revenues that accrue to homeowners when
supply increases from N1 to N1 +  do not more than compensate for the capital losses
homeowners incur on their homes because of the same rise in supply.
With this assumption, the preferences of voters over N^2 are single-peaked, and we can
apply Downs Theorem. The equilibrium amount of housing supply in period 2 corresponds
to the N^2 preferred by the median city resident, which we call m. The median city resident
has the median income among city residents: i.e. ym = 1  N12 .
The nal wealth of the median voter is then given by
wm =
N1
2
+ 
+ lm2

ym2   1 + N^2

+ hm

D +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


:
A certain city size is an equilibrium if and only if it maximizes the median voters welfare.
We can now state:
Proposition 4 The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
in which N1 < N2 < 1 are:
(i) The conditions for a market equilibrium;
(ii) The no-political-deviation condition: 
hm    ( + hm (1  )) @

@N^2

N^2=N2
!
U 0 = U 0city (3)
where
U 0 = (1  )U 0NN +  (1  )U 0SN + U 0SS ;
and
U 0city = (1  )U 0NN +  (1  )U 0SN
+
Z 1
1 N2
u0

N1
2
+ 
+max (0; ~ym   1 +N2) + hm ((1  ) g +  (1  ) 
)

d~ym:
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The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium with N1 = N2 are as above
but (3) is replaced with 
hm    ( + hm (1  )) @

@N^2

N^2=N2
!
U 0  U 0city : (4)
The equilibrium with endogenous housing supply must satisfy the conditions set out in
Proposition 1. Every agent i must choose the optimal housing consumption and investment
given the number of houses in the two periods, N1 and N2. However, there is now an
additional condition. The number of houses in the second period is endogenously determined
by the preference of the median city resident. In turn, the median voters preferences depend
on the amount of housing hm he owns. Thus, the conditions in (i) and (ii) constitute a
system of equations which are necessary and su¢ cient.
The left-hand side of equation (3) captures the marginal cost in terms of utility from the
capital gain/loss for the median voter as a result of an increase in the housing stock. There
are two components: the term hm is due to the linear and negative e¤ect of an increase in
N2 on r2 = 1 N2; the other, more complex term consists of the revenue that accrues to the
median voter as a homeowner and as a resident from the sale of housing permits. Part of
the benets accrue to the agents because they are city residents,  . The remainder accrue
to the agents as a proportion of the properties they own, hm (1  ).
The right-hand side of equation (3) represents the marginal benet of a change in city
size computed at the equilibrium size. This benet comes from two sources. First, a bigger
city means a smaller second period rent. Second, a bigger city means a greater probability
of earning a surplus from living and working in the city if the idiosyncratic shock occurs.17
In an equilibrium in which city size does not expand to its maximum value, the marginal
benet of increasing the size of the city cannot be greater than the marginal cost of increasing
the size of the city. However, because citizens are not allowed to reduce the size of their
city, it can happen that the marginal cost of city expansion exceeds the marginal benet.
This explains the inequality in equation (4).
Finally, one can draw clear welfare implications. Compare the equilibrium housing
supply (in the second period), N2, with a very high housing supply N2 = 1   , where 
is innitesimal.18 The hedging properties of housing are the same, but in the latter case
17At this point in the discussion, it should be clear that allowing for congestion e¤ects in the city, or
agglomeration economies, or peer e¤ects would only change the right-hand side of equation (3). This would
not a¤ect any of the insights we derive from the model beyond the obvious e¤ects such as, for example, the
stronger the negative congestion externality, the smaller the city size.
18There is a discontinuity between N2 = 1    and N2 = 1. In the former case, the rent in the second
period is r2 =  if there is no shock and r2 = g +  if there is a shock: Thus, the house is still a valuable
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the second-period rent is lower and the disposable income in the second period is higher for
every level of productivity yi. Hence, the choice set at time 1 improves for every agent.
In other words, suppose that, after yi is revealed but before agents choose hi, agent i is
asked what N2 2 [N1; 1) he prefers. Every agent would select N2 ! 1. This result holds a
fortiori before yi is revealed. Hence, in a very strong sense, the supply level determined in
Proposition 4 is ine¢ ciently low.
For expositional purposes, our ndings so far have been expressed in terms of a generic
utility function U (). However, as our agents have CARA utility, the same results can be
rewritten in a pure parametric form:
Proposition 5 Let a > 1 be the risk-aversion coe¢ cient. The rst-order condition for a
housing market equilibrium is
(1  ) exp [ ahmg] +  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

= 1;
and the rst-order condition for a political equilibrium is
1  hm +  ( + hm (1  ))

1
N1
(1 +N1   2N2 + g)

=  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2) :
All the variables in this proposition in principle can be replaced by real-world values.
Our two-period model is too simple to be used for empirical work. But this result suggests
that a suitable innite-horizon version could provide a useful platform to perform empirical
analysis in this area.
5 Persistence in Housing Supply
Now that we have a full characterization of the equilibrium, we can use it to answer a number
of natural questions. In this section, we study the dynamic properties of our equilibrium.
Namely, how does this periods city size a¤ect next periods size?
Proposition 6 The equilibrium number of houses in the second period N2 is a strictly
increasing function of the number of houses in the rst period N1.
hedge. In the latter case, the rent in the second period is always zero, and the house cannot be used as a
hedge. The welfare comparison between N2 = 1   and N2 = 1 is ambiguous.
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There are two cases. If N2 = N1 in equilibrium, then it is immediate that a higher N1
causes a higher N2. If instead the initial N1 yielded an interior solution, we can use the
rst-order conditions to determine the e¤ect of an increase in N1. We know from point (5) of
Proposition 2 that an increase in N1 does not make agent i change his housing investment.
However, an increase in N1 changes the identity of the median city resident, who is now
poorer and buys less housing. Hence, the voting outcome changes and allows for a strictly
higher N2.
This proposition captures a phenomenon of great practical importance. Consider a
community that, for exogenous reasons (natural barriers) or past events (a period of very
fast local growth), is today characterized by a low housing supply (recall that low housing
supply in the model is equivalent to high housing price to income ratio). Our analysis
predicts that this imbalance will persist over time. Its residents choose to be highly invested
in local housing and will vote against growth.
This observation could guide empirical work: If we observe a strong correlation between
the existence of natural barriers and house prices, we should not infer that high prices are
exclusively because of the barriers. The vicious cycle between ownership and supply plays
a role. This is important for policy purposes: As the next section argues, we can nd a
number of instruments to mitigate this e¤ect.
Example of Persistence
Before moving to the analysis of institutional reform, we will briey discuss a numerical
example of persistence in housing supply. Assume that
a = 2;  =
1
2
; g =
1
12
;  = 0;  =
1
2
:
Then, the two rst-order conditions become
 1 + 1
2
exp

 2

1
12
h

+
1
2
exp

 2

n
2
 N + 1
12
h

3
2
 N   1
2
exp [ 2N ]

= 0 ;
1  h = 1
4
exp

 2

n
2
 N + 1
12
h

(1 N) :
We plot the locus of the market equilibrium (black line, the steeper one) and the locus of
the political equilibrium (red line, the atter one) for various values of N1. The intersection
of the two loci is the solution to the unconstrained problem (disregarding the requirement
that N2  N1). If the intersection is to the right of N1, then it is the solution of the
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problem. If it is to the left, then the solution is given by the intersection of N1 and the
market equilibrium locus.
N1 = 0 N1 =
1
4
N1 =
1
2
In the rst plot (N1 ! 0), the market equilibrium locus intersects the political equilibrium
locus at approximately N2 = 0:13; in the second plot (N1 = 1=4) at N2 = 0:27; and in
the third plot (N1 = 1=2) at N2 = 0:48. In the rst two cases, the N2  N1 constraint is
not binding. In the third case it is, and the equilibrium value of N2 is then 0.50. As the
proposition predicts, these three values are strictly increasing.
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6 Institutional Reform
This section uses the model to study the e¤ects of a number of policies that have been
proposed.
6.1 Housing Permit Allocation
It is clear that the distribution of building permits plays an important part in determining
equilibrium supply of housing. The next proposition characterizes the e¤ect of allocating
fewer permits to cronies and more permits to citizens (i.e., an increase in ). Policy proposals
in this sense have been made by Glaeser, Schuetz, and Ward (2006) in the context of Greater
Boston.
Proposition 7 Start from a situation in which the sale of housing permits does not benet
citizens directly ( = 0) and the initial city size is su¢ ciently large (N1 > 12). Then, a
marginal increase in  causes an increase in housing supply.
Now, compare the e¤ect of an increase in  when owners get all the benet ( = 0) or
residents get all the benet ( = 1). Start from an equilibrium where  = 0, N1 > 12 and
the median voter owns h^m units of housing. A marginal increase in  causes an increase
in housing supply that is greater when  = 0 rather than  = 1 if and only if h^m > 1.
The rst part of this proposition says that giving the median voter a larger share of
housing windfalls (either as a resident or as a homeowner) will make the median voter
support greater urban growth.
The second part states that assigning permits to homeowners rather than to city res-
idents is better for growth if and only if the median resident owns more than one unit of
housing. If the median voter is highly invested in housing, handing out permits on the basis
of ownership will make him want to issue more permits. In practice, we do not expect the
choice between residents and owners to be crucial because in most communities the median
voter owns exactly one home (probably because of indivisibilities see discussion below).
6.2 Incentives for homeownership
Suppose that the tax system creates distortions between renting and buying. What happens
in the second period is irrelevant because it gets discounted. Suppose that there is a tax or
a subsidy on house purchases on the part of citizens (but not REITs). For every dollar of
housing purchased, the state o¤ers a subsidy of s cents (or a tax if s is negative).
22
Assume that  = 0 (for notational simplicity only; the proof would go through for any
). The nal wealth is now
wi = li1
 
yi1   r1

+ li2
 
yi2   r2

+ hi (r2 + r1   (1  s) p1) :
That is,
wi = li1
 
yi1   1 +N1

+ li2
 
yi2   1 +N2

+ hi (D + s (2 N1  N2)) :
It is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, a higher s increases hi. Hence, in equilibrium the
median voter buys more housing and votes for less housing expansion.
Proposition 8 A subsidy (tax) on house ownership reduces (boosts) housing supply.
Most Western countries have tax regimes that favor owning over renting. Apart from
portfolio allocation distortions, we nd that these regimes generate less housing supply.
This highlights a tension between the goal of making homeownership more a¤ordable in the
short term (by encouraging purchase by families rather than by institutional investors) and
the goal of making it more a¤ordable in the long term (by encouraging voters to allow for
new construction).
6.3 Multiple Cities and Centralized Decision-Making
Our core model was build on a twofold assumption: There is only one city and only city
residents participate in the political process that determines housing supply. Both parts of
the assumption can be questioned in practice. On the one hand, metropolitan areas in the
United States and in Europe tend to be divided into a number of independent jurisdictions.
On the other hand, state governments in the United States and national governments in
Europe often try to a¤ect local housing supply. It is then natural to ask what are the e¤ect
of centralizing or decentralizing housing policy decisions.
We begin with decentralization. Suppose that there are m independent cities. The cities
are initially identical in size: each with a stock of housing N1m . The model is as before (in
particular, the productivity shock is the same across cities), but now at the end of period
1 each of the m cities hold a separate election to decide the local housing supply.19
19We assume that the m independent cities are still part of the same labor market. It can be argued that
this is indeed the case for di¤erent municipalities in a metropolitan area. It would be extremely interesting
to look at multiple labor markets, with shock that are not perfectly correlated, but this is left to future
research.
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If  = 0, there is no di¤erence with the core model: The benet from a deviation is
unchanged and the equilibrium is exactly as in Proposition 4. If, however,  > 0, things
change. If the city is smaller, the median voter in m gets a larger share of the revenues
accruing from selling construction licenses in his city. Formally, the marginal benet of an
extra license becomes
@

@N^2

N^2=N2
=
m
N1

1 +
N1
m
  2N2 + g

;
which is increasing in m (and tends to 1 when the number of cities tends to innity). It is
then immediate from the rst-order political economy condition of Proposition 4 that the
second period supply must increase (in an interior equilibrium):
Proposition 9 If city planning decisions are made at a more decentralized level, housing
supply in the city increases.
Let us now turn to a more centralized planning system. Instead of assuming that housing
supply is decided by city residents, suppose that all citizens vote on housing supply; i.e.,
the political process takes into consideration not only the interest of city residents but also
those of potential future residents of the city. By proposition 2, the amount of housing is an
increasing function of productivity. The median citizen owns less housing than the median
city resident. Hence
Proposition 10 If city planning decisions are made at a national level, housing supply in
the city is higher.
In sum, there appears to be an interesting U-shaped relation between housing supply
and planning centralization. The lowest housing supply is achieved when planning decisions
are made by a polity that corresponds to the relevant labor market. This is because housing
price externalities operate at the labor market level. A discrepancy between the scope of
externalities and the scope of policy is likely to make policy less responsive to the desire of
maintaining high housing prices.
6.4 Barriers to Fractional Ownership
In practice, there are serious barriers to fractional ownership. Caplin et al. (1997) have
argued that this imposes a sizable cost on households. In our baseline case, fractional
ownership is allowed. In this section, we shall assume that fractional ownership is impossible.
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Suppose hi 2 f0; 1g. Our rst-order condition on the amount of housing owned by the
median voter is replaced by a comparison between the levels of wealth that the median
voter get if he buys no house and if buys one.20
Proposition 11 If allowing for fractional ownership reduces (increases) the amount of
housing that the median voter owns, housing supply increases (decreases).
Consider a community in which fractional ownership is impossible and, in the current
equilibrium, the median voter owns a house. Suppose that, if fractional ownership is intro-
duced, the median voter would indeed take advantage of it by releasing some of the home
equity to third parties. In this plausible case, the support for urban growth will increase.
Citizens will hence receive two benets from the introduction of fractional ownership, a
direct one coming from the ability to ne-tune their portfolio allocation and an indirect one
from the additional housing supply.
7 Conclusions
Our goal in this paper was to build a simple housing model with endogenous housing
consumption, housing investment, and supply regulation. We have shown that this model
generates an undersupply of housing, and that this undersupply is persistent over time. The
model also allows us to analyze a number of policy changes.
Ours is an extremely stylized model. There are only two departures from complete
markets: Future land development is noncontractible and future income shocks are nonin-
surable. While it is important to know that these two frictions can by themselves generate
a number of interesting phenomena, we also acknowledge the need for future work to enrich
this basic model with more features of actual housing markets.
An obvious extension concerns local externalities; e.g., congestion costs and agglomer-
ation economies. Our framework can easily be amended to include an interaction term in
peoples utility functions, which depends on who lives in the city. This term will be reected
in the rst-order condition that determines housing supply (Equation 3 on page 17) with
its obvious e¤ects on the equilibrium outcome.
Issues related to the provision of local public goods nanced by local taxes are more
complex. They introduce a trade-o¤of a di¤erent nature than the ones already incorporated
in our model: Limiting growth reduces the tax base.
20 It is trivial to extend this discussion to the case where hi 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g.
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One can also introduce frictions into the housing market. For example, suppose that
people must pay a moving cost if they move between period 1 and period 2. The e¤ect of
this form of friction on the rent risk is ambiguous. On one hand, city residents are somewhat
protected against the inux of outsiders. On the other, if rents do go up, current residents
do not have a free option of moving to the countryside. It is unclear what the overall e¤ect
would be on the hedging motive for homeownership and hence on the political support
for urban growth.
Credit constraints are another relevant form of housing market frictions. Such con-
straints are likely to reinforce the positive relation between income and housing investment
already in our model, especially if we allow for heterogeneous homes within locations.
Our theoretical results lead to a number of testable implications. A key insight we
draw from the model concerns the persistence of housing undersupply. This theoretical
prediction sheds new light on the empirical nding that historical housing density predicts
current tightness in housing supply (e.g., Evenson and Wheaton, 2003, Glaeser and Ward,
2006). We also note that the U.S. metropolitan areas that have experienced the greatest
growth in housing prices over the past three decades are areas that were already expensive
in the seventies. Furthermore, the households who moved into these areas recently have
tended to be richer than the ones who were already there, pushing early owners to a lower
rank within the local income distribution (Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2005, Ortalo-Magné
and Rady, 2005) the type of labor income risk we focus on in our model.
Our model yields testable implications on voter behavior. The preferences of voters for
supply restrictions depend on votersinvestment in housing. Dubin, Kiewiet and Noussair
(1985) analyze voting data on urban growth control measures on the ballot in the city and
county of San Diego in 1988. They take advantage of cross-sectional di¤erences in the socio-
economic makeup of precincts to tease out the factors correlated with support for growth
controls. They nd strong support for the hypothesis that homeowners are more likely to
favor growth controls. 21
Finally, the model highlights a potentially important link between housing supply, the
welfare system and labor market regulations. We assumed that labor income risk is unin-
surable. However, partial insurance may exist if the state provides a safety net through
welfare payments or job protection. In our framework, a reduction in idiosyncratic labor
income risk would lead to a lower desire for homeownership and higher housing supply.
21Using the US National Election Study, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) show that, controlling for other
individual characteristics, homeowners who live in areas with a concentration of rms in industries vulnerable
to international competition are more likely to oppose free trade agreements than renters.
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It is interesting to note that Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have
much higher ownership rates than Germany and Switzerland and have experienced much
stronger housing price growth since the seventies. According to Evans and Hartwich (2005)
the di¤erences in housing price growth rates across these countries are due primarily to
di¤erences in supply regulations. These facts appear to be consistent with a situation in
which German and Swiss workers face a lower uninsurable labor risk than their Anglo-Saxon
counterparts. It is an intriguing possibility that the same combination of labor market tur-
bulence and unemployment policies at the heart of the work by Ljundqvist and Sargent
(1998, 2005) on di¤erences in unemployment trends across Western countries could also
explain the di¤erences in the trends in their housing prices.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst-order condition on hi is
  (1  )gU 0NN +  (1  ) (1  ) gU 0SN +  (1  ) gU 0SS = 0:
We write
	
 
hi; yi
   U 0NN + (1  )U 0SN + U 0SS :
The rst-order condition is satised if and only if 	
 
hi; yi

= 0. Note also that
	h
 
hi; yi

= gU 00NN + (1  ) g (1  )U 00SN + (1  ) gU 00SS < 0:
Hence, for every yi there exists a unique h1 such that 	
 
hi; yi

= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove (1), note that
	y
 
hi; yi

=
8<: 0 if y
i < 1 N2
 U 00NN + (1  )U 00SN if 1 N2 < yi < 1 N1
 2U 00NN + 2 (1  )U 00SN + U 00SS if yi > 1 N1
Rewrite the last expression as
	y
 
hi; yi

= 2

 U
00
NN
U 0NN

U 0NN   2 (1  )

 U
00
SN
U 0SN

U 0SN   

 U
00
SS
U 0SS

U 0SS :
As the utility is CARA, we can write
	y
 
hi; yi
 / 2U 0NN   2 (1  )U 0SN   U 0SS
= U 0NN   (1  )U 0SN
= U 0SS > 0:
where the two equalities are due to the rst-order condition. Similarly, the second expression can
be rewritten as
	y
 
hi; yi

= U 0NN   (1  )U 0SN = U 0SS > 0:
Recall that 	h was derived above and was found to be always negative. By the implicit function
theorem,
@hi
@yi
=  	y
 
hi; yi

	h (hi; yi)

= 0 if yi < 1 N2
> 0 if yi > 1 N2
To prove (2), examine
	
 
0; yi
   U 0NN  0; yi+ (1  )U 0SN  0; yi+ U 0SS  0; yi :
Note that
U 0NN
 
0; yi

= u0
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi   1 +N2

U 0SN
 
0; yi

= u0
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi1   1 +N2

U 0SS
 
0; yi

= E~y

u0
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; ~yi   1 +N2

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Recall that 	y
 
hi; yi

is nondecreasing in yi. First, if yi < 1 N2,
U 0NN
 
0; yi

= u0 (0)
U 0SN
 
0; yi

= u0 (0)
U 0SS
 
0; yi

= E~yi

u0
 
max
 
0; ~yi   yN2

< u0 (0)
Hence, if yi < 1 N2,
	
 
0; yi

<  u0 (0) + (1  )u0 (0) + u0 (0) = 0:
Second, it is easy to see that there exists a threshold such that, for a higher yi,
u0
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi1   1 +N2

< E~y

u0
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; ~yi   1 +N2

:
In that case, 	
 
0; yi

> 0. As 	
 
0; yi

is nondecreasing in yi, there exists a threshold y  1 N2
such that 	
 
0; yi
  0 if and only if yi  y. This means that agents below (above) y choose a
negative (positive) amount of housing.
Now, turn to (3). For any positive ", consider an agent with yi = y + ". Consider hi = 1 and
note that
UNN
 
1; yi

= u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi   1 +N2
  g
USN
 
1; yi

= u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; yi1   1 +N2

+ (1 + ) g

USS
 
1; yi

= E~yi

u
 
max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+max
 
0; ~yi   1 +N2

+ (1 + ) g

Note that UNN
 
1; yi

, USN
 
1; yi

, and USS
 
1; yi

do not depend on , and that
U 0NN (1; y
 + ") < U 0SN (1; y
 + ") :
Hence, for  su¢ ciently high,
	(1; y + ") > 0;
and the optimal hi must be greater than 1.
To prove (4), consider
	N2
 
hi; yi

=  U 00NN + (1  )U 00SN
+
Z 1
1 N2
u00(max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+ ~yi   1 +N2 + (1 + )g) d~yi if yi1 > 1 N2
and
	N2
 
hi; yi

= 
Z 1
1 N2
u00(max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+ ~yi   1 +N2 + (1 + )g) d~yi if yi1 < 1 N2:
If yi1 > 1 N2, CARA implies
	N2
 
hi; yi
 / U 0NN   (1  )U 0SN    Z 1
1 N2
u0(max
 
0; yi   1 +N1

+ ~yi   1 +N2 + (1 + )g) d~yi
> U 0NN   (1  )U 0SN   U 0SS = 0:
Instead, if yi1 < 1 N2, 	N2
 
hi; yi

< 0. We then have
@hi
@N2

< 0 if yi > 1 N2
> 0 if yi < 1 N2
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To prove (5), note that, if yi < 1 N1, 	N1
 
hi; yi

= 0. If yi > 1 N1,
	N1

h^i; yi

=  U 00NN

h^i; yi

+ (1  )U 00SN

h^i; yi

+ U 00SS

h^i; yi

;
which, by CARA, can be rewritten as 	

h^i; yi

and, by the rst-order condition, is equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 3
Given the conjectured level of N2, the agents face rst period rent and price as follows:
r1 = 1 N1 +  N2  N1
N1
(1 N2 + g)
p1 = 1 N1 +

1 + 
N2  N1
N1

(1 N2 + g)
The payo¤ of living and working in the city for agents yi assuming a deviation to N^2 is
yi1 + 
N^2  N1
N1
~b  r1
= yi1   1 +N1 + 
 
N^2  N1
N1

1  N^2 + g

  N2  N1
N1
(1 N2 + g)
!
We denote 
 the change in the total value of the housing permits per unit of existing housing due
to a political deviation from N2 to N^2:

  N^2  N1
N1

1  N^2 + g

  N2  N1
N1
(1 N2 + g) :
The expected gain from investing in a unit of city housing is a¤ected by a deviation from N2 to N^2
as follows
~r2 + r1 +  (1  ) N^2  N1
N1
~b  p1 = D +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 

Proof of Proposition 4
The median city resident decides the election. His wealth in the three possible outcomes is
 If there is no shock:
wNN = y
m   1 +N1 + 
+ ym   1 + N^2 + hm

 g +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


= N^2 + 
+ h
m

 g +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


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 If the aggregate shock alone occurs
wSN = N^2 + 
+ h
m

(1  ) g +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


 If both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shock occur
wSS =
N1
2
+ 
+max

0; ~ym   1 + N^2

+ hm

(1  ) g +N2   N^2 +  (1  ) 


Let
Um = (1  )u(wNN ) +  (1  )u(wSN ) + u(wSS)
The condition for N2 to be the equilibrium choice is that
dUm
dN^2

N2=N^2
= 0
That is
dUm
dN^2
= (1  )u0(wNN )dwNN
dN^2
+  (1  )u0(wSN )dwSN
dN^2
+ E

u0(wSS)
dwSS
dN^2

:
Note that
dwNN
dN^2
=
dwSN
dN^2
= 1 + 
d

dN^2
+ hm
 
 1 +  (1  ) d

dN^2
!
= 1 K
where
K = hm    ( + hm (1  )) d

dN^2
and
dwSS
dN^2
= 
d

dN^2
  d
dN^2
max (0; ~ym   1 N2) + hm

 1 +  (1  ) d

dN^2

= 
d

dN^2
+ I~ym>1 N^2 + h
m

 1 +  (1  ) d

dN^2

=

1 K if ~ym > 1  N^2
 K if ~ym < 1  N^2
Note also that
@

@N^2

N^2=N2
=
1
N1
(1 +N1   2N2 + g) :
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Hence
dUm
dN^2

N^2=N2
= (1  )u0(wNN ) (1 K) +  (1  )u0(wSN ) (1 K) + 
Z 1
1 N2
u0 (wSS (hm; ~ym)) (1 K) d~ym
+
Z 1 N2
0
u0 (wSS (hm; 0)) ( K) d~ym
=   ((1  )u0(wNN ) +  (1  )u0(wSN ) + u0(wSS))K
+(1  )u0(wNN ) +  (1  )u0(wSN ) + 
Z 1
1 N2
u0 (wSS (hm; ~ym)) d~ym
Proof of Proposition 5
Start with the condition for a political equilibrium: 
hm    ( + hm (1  )) @

@N^2

N^2=N2
!
U 0 = U 0city (5)
First, note that the rst-order condition on the housing market implies
U 0 = (1  )U 0NN +  (1  )U 0SN + U 0SS
= U 0NN
= exp [ a (N2   hmg)] :
Next,
U 0city = (1  )U 0NN +  (1  )U 0SN + 
Z 1
1 N2
u0SS (wSS (h
m; ~ym)) d~ym
= U 0NN   
Z 1 N2
0
u0SS (wSS (h
m; ~ym)) d~ym:
Note that Z 1 N2
0
u0SS (wSS (h
m; ~ym)) d~ym
=
Z 1 N2
0
exp [ a (ym   1 +N1 + hm (1  ) g)] d~ym
=
Z 1 N2
0
exp

 a

N1
2
+ hm (1  ) g

d~ym
= exp

 a

N1
2
+ hm (1  ) g

(1 N2)
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Hence,
U 0city
U 0
=
U 0NN   
R 1 N2
0
u0SS (wSS (h
m; ~ym)) d~ym
U 0NN
=
exp [ a (N2   hmg)]   exp
 a  N12 + hm (1  ) g (1 N2)
exp [ a (N2   hmg)]
= 1   exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2)
Thus, the political equilibrium condition is:
hm    ( + hm (1  )) @

@N^2

N^2=N2
= 1   exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2) ;
which can immediately be rewritten as in the statement of the proposition.
The other rst-order condition is:
 U 0NN + (1  )U 0SN + U 0SS = 0
where
U 0NN = exp [ a (N2   hmg)]
U 0SN = exp [ a (N2 + hm (1  ) g)]
U 0SS =
Z 1
0
exp [ a ((ym   1 +N1) + max (~ym   1 +N2; 0) + hm (1  ) g)] d~ym
= exp [ a ((ym   1 +N1) + hm (1  ) g)]
Z 1
0
exp [ amax (~ym   1 +N2; 0)] d~ym
= exp

 a

N1
2
+ hm (1  ) g
Z 1
0
exp [ amax (~ym   1 +N2; 0)] d~ym
= exp

 a

N1
2
+ hm (1  ) g

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ 2N2]

because Z 1
0
exp [ amax (~ym   1 +N2; 0)] d~ym
=
Z 1 N2
0
exp [0] d~ym +
Z 1
1 N2
exp [ a (~ym   1 +N2)] d~ym
= 1 N2   1
2
exp [ a (1  1 +N2)] + 1
2
exp [ a (1 N2   1 +N2)]
= 1 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2] + 1
2
=
3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]
which rewrites as
  exp [ a (N2   hmg)] + (1  ) exp [ a (N2 + hm (1  ) g)]
+ exp

 a

N1
2
+ hm (1  ) g

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

= 0
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and can be simplied to
 1 + (1  ) exp [ ahmg] +  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

= 0:
Proof of Proposition 6
Starting from the rst-order conditions in Proposition 5, let
f =  1 + (1  ) exp [ ahmg] +  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

g = (1  hm)   exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2)
Compute partial derivatives and simplify using the rst-order conditions:
fh =  ag (1  ) exp [ ahmg]  ag exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

=  ag < 0
gh =  1 + ag exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2)
=  1 + ag (1  hm) =  1 + ag   aghm < 0 since g < 1=a
fN2 = a exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

+ exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

( 1 + exp [ aN2])
=  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

a

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

+ ( 1 + exp [ aN2])

= a exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2) > 0
gN2 =  a exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2) +  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

=  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

( a (1 N2) + 1)
=  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(aN2   a+ 1) 7 0
exp

 2

n
2
 N + 1
12
h

(2N   1)
fN1 =   exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ aN2]

< 0
gN1 =  exp

 a

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2) > 0
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The implicit function theorem says that"
@hm
@N1
@N2
@N1
#
=

fh fN2
gh gN2
 1   fN1
 gN1

That is "
@hm
@N1
@N2
@N1
#
=
"
  gN2
fN2

gh
   fh
#   fN1
 gN1

where  =  fhgN2 + ghfN2 is the Jacobian, which must be negative if the second-order condition
is satised. Then
@N2
@N1
=  gh

fN1 +
fh

gN1
=
1
( ) (  ( ) (+) + ( ) ( )) > 0
This shows that the unconstrained N2 is increasing in N1. If we denote the unconstrained value with
N2, it is immediate to see that the constrained value max
 
N2; N1

is increasing in N1 a fortiori.
Proof of Proposition 7
Start with
@

@N^2

N^2=N2
=
1
N1
(1 +N1   2N2 + g)
f =  1 + (1  ) exp [ 2hmg] +  exp

 2

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

3
2
 N2   1
2
exp [ 2N2]

g =
 
1  hm + 

 + h^m (1  )
 @

@N^2

N^2=N2
!
   exp

 2

N1
2
 N2 + hmg

(1 N2)
Assume that  = 0 and look at the e¤ect of an increase in .
By the Implicit Function Theorem"
@hm
@
@N2
@
#
=
"
  gN2
fN2

gh
   fh
#   f
 g

Note that
g =

 + h^m (1  )
 1
N1
(1 +N1   2N2 + g) > 0
if N2 < 1+N12 . In turn, N2 <
1+N1
2 holds if N1 >
1
2 . As f = 0, we have
@hm
@
=  fN2

g =   (+)
( ) (+) > 0
@N2
@
=
fh

g =
( )
( ) (+) > 0:
The proofs of Propositions 811 follow directly from the arguments in the main text.
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